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I.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is from a final Judgment dated December 2, 1994 (a copy of which is
attached hereto as Appendix A), entered by The Honorable Tyrone E. Medley of the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah. The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction
over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j).

The Supreme Court, acting

pursuant to Rule 42, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, transferred this appeal to this court by
order dated February 16, 1995.
H.
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The issue presented for review is as follows:
Whether the trial court erred in concluding that a mobile home park lessor's temporary
waiver of its right to declare an immediate forfeiture of a lease with its lessee did not, as a
matter of law, require the lessor to notify the tenant that unless she cured her default by a date
certain, the lessor would proceed with its forfeiture remedy.
This issue is a question of law on which this court will not defer to the trial court, but
will review the trial court's determination for correctness. Pratt by and through Pratt v. Mitchell
Hall Irrigation Co.. 813 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Utah 1991); Avila v. Winn. 794 P.2d 20, 22 (Utah
1990).
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in.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. ORDINANCES OR RULES
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances or rules whose interpretation
is believed to be solely determinative of the issues on appeal.
IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
Appellee Crescentwood Village, Inc. ("CVI") instituted this action under the Utah Mobile

Home Park Residency Act, Utah Code Ann. §§57-16-1 et seq.« to terminate the interest of its
lessee, appellant June Johnson ("Mrs. Johnson") in a lease agreement dated July 1, 1992 ("Lease
Agreement")1 and dispossess Mrs. Johnson from the leased property ("Property"). (R. 2-11).
CVI's claimed basis for terminating the Lease Agreement and evicting Mrs. Johnson from the
Property was her failure to cure several alleged violations of rules governing the Property. Id.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Trial Court,
Shortly after CVI filed its complaint, Mrs. Johnson began depositing with the court clerk

the rent payments due under the Lease Agreement. (R. 64-66). She made all of the required
payments. (R. 632).
At trial, the court determined that Mrs. Johnson completely cured two, and substantially
cured one, of the three events of default specified in CVI's notice of default ("Notice of

1

A copy of the Lease Agreement is attached hereto as Appendix B.

2

Default"),2 and that she did so within the required fifteen day cure period. (R. 605). The court
further determined that over the next seventy days, CVI took no action to terminate the Lease
Agreement, but instead "tried to work with [her]." (R. 610).3 At the end of this seventy day
period of forbearance, CVI provided Mrs. Johnson with two verbal warnings that "things
weren't looking good" and that it would evict her "if things didn't get going." (Tr. at R.
750-51). These warnings never specified a date certain by which the uncured event of default
had to be cured for Mrs. Johnson to avoid being evicted. (Tr. at R. 751-52). About three days
later, Mrs. Johnson paid two months of back rent in response to CVI's written demand. (Tr.
at R. 695). CVI accepted her payment. Id. However, on the following day, CVI served Mrs.
Johnson with a Notice of Termination.4 (R. 606).
The court held that even though CVI had relaxed the fifteen day cure period specified
in the Notice of Default by "work[ing] with" Mrs. Johnson for seventy days in an effort to cure
the single uncured event of default, CVI could summarily terminate the Lease Agreement at the
end of that forbearance period without apprising Mrs. Johnson of a date certain by which her
full cure was required. (R. 607, 610). The court accordingly entered judgment against Mrs.
Johnson for rent in the amount of $3,200.00 and attorney's fees and costs in the amount of

2

A copy of the Notice of Default is attached hereto as Appendix C.

3

In correctly determining that CVI relaxed the requirement in the Notice of Default that any cure be
accomplished within the specified fifteen-day period, the court properly credited the trial testimony of CVI's park
manager that M[a]fter agreeing with her that it [the Property] was really starting to look better we would just go on
past that 15-day notice . . . ." (Tr. at R. 739).
4

A copy of the Notice of Termination is attached hereto as Appendix D.
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$9,413.50. (R. 617-18). The court further evicted Mrs. Johnson from the Property and
terminated her interest in the Lease Agreement. Id. This relief was embodied in the court's
Judgment dated December 2, 1994 and was based upon its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.5 Mrs. Johnson filed her notice of appeal on December 12, 1994. (R. 619).
C.

Statement of Facts,
Both before and after the Lease Agreement was signed in July 1992, CVI and

Mrs. Johnson had numerous disputes regarding the terms and conditions of Mrs. Johnson's
occupancy of the Property. (Finding of Fact No. 21, R. 610; Tr. at R. 654, 671). The parties'
efforts to resolve those disputes resulted in a "pattern" under which C V I " . . . tried to work with
[Mrs. Johnson]." (Finding of Fact No. 21, R. 610). Near the end of this "pattern," on May
6, 1993, CVI served Mrs. Johnson with the Notice of Default. (Finding of Fact No. 7, R. 605).
The Notice of Default apprised Mrs. Johnson that she was in violation of the Lease
Agreement for three reasons: (i) she maintained an unlicensed motor vehicle in her driveway
("Event of Default No. 1"), (ii) her yard had too many weeds and her driveway was too
cluttered ("Event of Default No. 2"), and (iii) her home needed to be repainted ("Event of
Default No. 3") (collectively, the "Events of Default"). Id. The Notice of Default advised Mrs.
Johnson that she had fifteen days in which to cure the Events of Default, and that if she failed
to do so within that period of time, CVI would commence eviction proceedings. Id. The
second unnumbered paragraph of the Notice of Default advised Mrs. Johnson that if she actually

A copy of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is attached hereto as Appendix E.
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cured the Events of Default, but later violated the same or different rules of the mobile home
park, " . . . this will result in forfeiture of [her] lease and eviction without any further period of
cure." Id.6
Of the three Events of Default, the trial court properly determined that Mrs. Johnson had
fully and timely cured Event of Default No. 1 and Event of Default No. 3, but had only
substantially cured Event of Default No. 2. (Finding of Fact Nos. 7, 8, R. 605). After the
fifteen day cure period specified in the Notice of Default expired on May 21, 1993, CVI took
no action to terminate the Lease Agreement or dispossess Mrs. Johnson from the Property. (Tr.
at R. 739, 747). Rather, because Mrs. Johnson had cured Event of Default No. 1 and Event
of Default No. 3, and was attempting to cure Event of Default No. 2, CVI agreed " . . . to work
with her for awhile." (R. 610; Tr. at R. 747). According to the testimony of CVI's own
manager, CVI " . . . agree[d] with [Mrs. Johnson] that it [the Property] was really starting to
look better [and] we would just go on past that 15-day notice . . . ." (Tr. at R. 739).
Therefore, CVI extended through late July 1993 — some seventy days after the expiration of the
fifteen day cure period specified in the Notice of Default — the period within which Mrs.
Johnson could cure Event of Default No. 2. (Tr. at R. 747).
However, at the end of July 1993 — two or three days after Mrs. Johnson had given birth
to her new baby, Tr. at R. 753 — CVI's manager told Mrs. Johnson that " . . . we could not

6

Because the trial court determined that Mrs. Johnson did not cure all the Events of Default, see Findings of
Fact Nos. 7 and 8 at R. 605, this provision of the Notice of Default ~ a provision which presumes to confer on CVI
the right to summarily forfeit the Lease Agreement - is not applicable as a matter of law.
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work with her any longer and that we would be evicting if things didn't get going at the end of
July." (Tr. at R. 751). That oral notification never specified a date certain by which Mrs.
Johnson had to fully cure Event of Default No. 2 to avoid having the Lease Agreement forfeited.
(Tr. at R. 751-52). According to CVTs manager, the only date certain that CVI had ever
provided to Mrs. Johnson was the fifteen day cure period specified in the Notice of Default.
(Tr. at R. 752).
In the meantime, about two weeks earlier on July 14, 1993, CVI served Mrs. Johnson
with a Three Day Notice to Pay Rent or Vacate the Property ("Three-Day Notice"). (Tr. at R.
694-95). In response to the Three-Day Notice, Mrs. Johnson paid all of the required rent with
a check that she delivered to CVI on August 2, 1993. (Tr. at R. 695). At the time CVI
accepted that payment, it knew that on the following day it would be seeking to terminate the
Lease Agreement. (Tr. at R. 700, 760). However, CVI never informed Mrs. Johnson of that
fact. (Tr. at R. 704). CVI accordingly served Mrs. Johnson with its Notice of Termination on
August 3, 1993. (Tr. at R. 665). Even after CVI purported to terminate the Lease Agreement,
CVI consistently noted on its payment ledger card that Mrs. Johnson was responsible for the
payment of late charges owing under the Lease Agreement. (Trial Exhibit 46; Tr. at R. 694).
Mrs. Johnson asserted at trial that under Utah law, once CVI relaxed the fifteen day cure
period specified in its Notice of Default, CVI could not subsequently insist upon strict
compliance with the Notice of Default without providing an unequivocal notice that tardy
performance would not be further tolerated. (Tr. at R. 766-72). The trial court, however, held

6

that no such notice was required. (Finding of Fact No. 13, R. 607). It accordingly entered
judgment against Mrs. Johnson for unpaid rent, attorney's fees, and forfeiture of the Lease
Agreement. (R. 617-18).
V.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Under the Notice of Default that CVI served upon Mrs. Johnson, Mrs. Johnson was
granted a period of fifteen days in which to cure the Events of Default or face eviction from the
Property. Because Mrs. Johnson timely and fully cured two, and substantially cured one, of the
three Events of Default, CVI decided to work with Mrs. Johnson beyond the fifteen day cure
period.

In doing so, CVI temporarily waived its right to immediately forfeit the Lease

Agreement and evict Mrs. Johnson from the Property.
Utah law has long recognized that a promisee who has informed its promisor that strict
performance will not be required, but who later decides to require strict performance, must
provide the promisor with reasonable, advance notice that no further forbearance will be granted.
Under this principle, CVI was required to provide Mrs. Johnson with an unequivocal notice that
her failure to cure all of the Events of Default by a date certain would result in CVI's forfeiture
of the Lease Agreement and Mrs. Johnson's eviction from the Property. CVI's decision to pull
the forfeiture trigger on Mrs. Johnson without such notice violated Utah law.

7

VI.

:

ARGUMENT
AFTER CVI AGREED TO RELAX THE FIFTEEN DAY CURE PERIOD
SPECIFIED BY ITS NOTICE OF DEFAULT, IT WAS REQUIRED BY UTAH
LAW TO PROVIDE MRS. JOHNSON WITH REASONABLE NOTICE OF A NEW
DATE CERTAIN BY WHICH MRS. JOHNSON WAS REQUIRED TO CURE.
Utah law " . . . disfavor[s] forfeiture where the [promisee] has misled the [promisor] into
thinking that the forfeiture provision will not be strictly enforced." Adair v. Bracken. 745 P.2d
849, 852 (Utah App. 1987).7 Accord, Grow v. Marwick Dev.. Inc.. 621 P.2d 1249, 1251-52
(Utah 1980). This is an extension of the principle that a promisee who has induced its promisor
to believe that strict performance will not be required, must provide the promisor with
reasonable, advance notice before it can insist on strict performance. Pacific Dev. Co. v.
Stewart, 195 P.2d 748, 750 (Utah 1948). Accord. 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord & Tenant § 327
(1995) ("[t]he landlord must give sufficient notice to the lessee of the landlord's intent to insist
upon strict compliance with the lease terms where such compliance has not been required in the
past"); Angus Hunt Ranch. Inc. v. REB. Inc.. 577 P.2d 645, 650 (Wyo. 1978) ("so where the
time fixed by the contract for performance is permitted to pass, both parties concurring, the time
of performance thereafter becomes indefinite, and one party cannot rescind until full notice and
a reasonable time for performance is given"). This principle means that " . . . the acceptance
by the [promisee] of the [promisor's] past due payments and its other conduct towards the
7

Because ". . . forfeiture is a harsh remedy, clarity must be required before any notice will work such a
result." Dang v. Cox Corp.. 655 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1982). Accord. Russell v. Park City Corp.. 546 P.2d 1274,
1276 (Utah 1973).
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[promisor] leading the latter to believe that strict performance would not be required by the
[promisee], imposes upon the [promisee] the duty of giving to the [promisor] a reasonable notice
before it may insist on strict performance by the [promisor]." Pacific Dev. Co.. 195 P.2d at
750.
The requirement of such notice " . . . is based upon the equitable consideration that by
his conduct the [promisee] has led the [promisor] into the belief that the former will continue
to waive the strict performance of the contract." Id. See also Tanner v. Baadsgaard. 612 P.2d
345, 347 (Utah 1980) (seller who waives strict compliance with payment schedule in earnest
money agreement must give notice and a reasonable time to perform before thereafter strictly
enforcing the time requirement); Morris v. Svkes. 624 P.2d 681, 684 (Utah 1981) (where
contracting parties were negotiating a reinstatement at the time of seller's notice of termination
of contract, "fairness" would require definite notice to buyer upon default that he must "pay up,
or forfeit" the payments he had made under the contract). Fuhriman v. Bissegger. 375 P.2d 27,
28 (Utah 1962) (where the promisee had waived strict or substantial compliance and had failed
to unequivocally apprise the promisor of what was required of him to avoid termination, " . . .
this behavior led [the promisor] to believe that strict performance is not required.")
Where the promisee has temporarily waived default and has made contradictory demands,
this " . . . would leave some doubt in the [promisor's] mind as to what the [promisee] expected
and lead the [promisor] to believe that strict compliance with the contract is not required,
estop[ping] [the promisee] from effecting a forfeiture of the [promisor's] interest." Grow v.

9

MarwickDev.. Inc.. 621 P.2d at 1252. The right of the promisor to receive a notice specifying
that it has a reasonable time in which to cure its default is necessary because "without this notice
the defaulting [promisor] would not know what to do." Hansen v. Christensen. 545 P.2d 1152,
1154 (Utah 1976). In the final analysis, a promisee has no obligation to grant forbearance to
its promisor beyond what is required by their contract and specified by the promisee's notice;
however, once the promisee does so, it cannot decide unilaterally to insist on strict performance
without providing its debtor with advance notice that strict performance will be required. Adair,
745 P.2d at 859; Tanner. 612 P.2d at 347; Fuhriman. 375 P.2d at 28; Pacific Dev.. 195 P.2d
at 750.
In this case, it is undisputed that CVI agreed to relax thefifteenday cure period specified
in its Notice of Default. CVTs own on-site manager testified that he ". . . agree[d] with
[Mrs. Johnson] that it [the Property] was really starting to look better [and] we would just go
on past that 15-day notice . . . ." (Tr. at R. 739). It is also undisputed that that forbearance
period extended for about 70 days, more than quadruple the initial specified cure period. (Tr.
at R. 747). Once CVI agreed to relax or waive Mrs. Johnson's initial obligation to comply
strictly with the cure period specified in the Notice of Default, CVI was obligated by Utah law
to afford Mrs. Johnson a reasonable opportunity to cure the uncured event of default by a date
certain or face forfeiture. Adair. 745 P.2d at 859; Tanner. 612 P.2d at 347; Fuhriman. 375
P.2d at 28; Pacific Dev.. 195 P.2d at 750. CVI, however, never provided such an opportunity
and never specified a date certain beyond which Mrs. Johnson faced immediate forfeiture of the

10

Lease Agreement and eviction from the Property. Rather, CVI only told Mrs. Johnson in late
July 1993 that "things weren't looking good" and that it would evict her if "things didn't get
going." (Tr. at R. 750-51). About three days later, Mrs. Johnson paid, and CVI accepted, past
due rent in response to a Three-Day Notice which had been served on her two weeks earlier.
(Tr. at R. 695). The following day, however, CVI unexpectedly pulled the forfeiture trigger
on Mrs. Johnson and served her with a Notice of Termination. (R. 606).
CVI's failure to provide Mrs. Johnson with a notice that it would require strict
performance after a seventy day period of mutually agreed forbearance violated Utah law. The
trial court's failure to apply settled law to the undisputed facts enabled CVI to forfeit the Lease
Agreement and dispossess Mrs. Johnson from the Property when CVI had no legal right to do
so. This Court accordingly should vacate the Judgment and remand the case with instructions
to enter judgment in favor of Mrs. Johnson for all of the attorney's fees and costs that she has
incurred to vindicate her rights under the Lease Agreement.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred, as a matter of law, in declining to apply the settled legal principle
that a promisee who relaxes the requirement of strict performance cannot thereafter insist on
strict performance without providing its promisor with reasonable advance notice that strict
performance will be required by a date certain in the future. This Court should, therefore,

11

reverse and vacate the Judgment and remand this case to the district court with instructions to
enter judgment in favor of Mrs. Johnson for all attorney's fees and costs that she reasonably and
necessarily incurred to enforce her rights under the Lease Agreement.
DATED this 7

day of May, 1995.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

John lv\Anderson
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

7

day of May, 1995, I caused two true and correct

copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to be mailed, via first-class, postage prepaid, to the
following:
James R. Boud, Esq.
302 West 5400 South, Suite 103
Murray, Utah 84107
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ASHTON, BRAUNBERGER, POULSEN & BOUD, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
302 West 5400 South, Suite 103
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 263-0300
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CRESCENTWOOD VILLAGE, INC.,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

vs.
Civil No. 930906137
Judge Tyrone Medley

JUNE JOHNSON,
Defendant.

The

trial

in the

above case was heard before the

Honorable Tyrone E. Medley on Wednesday, November 2, 1994.

The

Court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
hereby grants judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against the
Defendant and ORDERS, ADJUDGED AND DECREES as follows:
1.

Plaintiff is granted judgment against Defendant for

the sum of $3,200.00 principal, $9,367.50 attorney's fees, and
$46.00 costs for a total judgment of $12,613.50.
2.

The

lease

agreement

between

the

Plaintiff

and

Defendant for the premises located at 255 East Hidden View Drive,
#267, Sandy, Utah, is hereby terminated and the Clerk of the Court
is directed to issue to Plaintiff a writ of restitution which will

fl 0 A a 1 7

direct the Constable and/or Sheriff of Salt Lake County to restore
the premises to the Plaintiff.
3.

The third party complaint filed in this action is

hereby dismissed with prejudice.
4.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to turn over to

Plaintiff all rents that are currently being held in trust relating
to this matter.

Plaintiff is to credit Defendant these amounts

upon receipt of the same.
5.

Plaintiff is awarded after-accruing costs and after-

accruing attorney's fees upon application to the Court for the same
and a determination by the Court that such costs and fees are
reasonable.

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

JohnxT. Anderson
Attorney for Defendant
014-072-bn
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R e s i d e n t (s>
agree
t o p a y an a d d i t i o n a l l a t o
change
of
£13.00.
: - s i d s n t ( e ) a - j r e e i e } t o - F u r t h e r pay f 1 5 - 0 0 f o r a d i s h o n o r e d ber.l. o h o e l : .
1? v
led:
is
dishonored,
t h e P a r k may r e q u i r e R e s i d e n t (s> t o
mal.c
all
future
ayments w i t h c a s h o r c a s h i e r ' s c h e c k .
Deposit
L-sidentCs)
i f t e e n (13)
?.ter.

Refunds.
Any r e t u r n a b l e d e p o s i t s s h a l l be d e l i v e r e d o r m a i l e d t :
uxthin
thirty
' 3 0 ' days o f
ts-rni-.aticn cf
tenancy
or
withir
d a y s o f r e c e i p t c f R e s i d e n t I s ; ? new n a i l i n g a d d r e s s , w h i c h e v e r i r

w** wxu/Ac wuuupqnuy •
.lilt' jjr e:n.wej &!»€&!• cs- Lisrc as a residencc
y the undersigned adult(s) and
fe?
children, and for nc other purpose
ithout the prior written consent of the Park.
Any children born to or legally adopted by Resident's) after moving intc
ark shall be accepted, and Resident(s) will bs charged $3.00 per month per
ach additional child.
Occupancy by guests, whether or not related tc Resident(s) , staying over
ifteen (15) days will be considered tc be in violation of this provisior
nless prior written consent is given by the Par!..
I --J

II

Park Rules. A cc^y of Park Rules is attached and hereby made a part of
lis lease. ftules may be changed by the Par!-: by giving 60 days written notice
: Resident (s? .
Rule changes e.rc incorporated as a part of this lease.
:sidsnt(s) c-hr.ll also be bound by all rules psrtaining to the use of all
Dmmon areas, including, but not limited to, the recreation building or
.ubhouso and swimming pcjl.
Unl awful and Disorderly Conduct.
Reci dent iz)
shall net permit
any
^lawful or immoral practice to be committed on the promises.
Any conduct
lich is defined as criminal or unlawful under the previsions of Utah state
tw, or by local ordinance or statute. v.hether or net prosecuted by
>vernment, shall be grounds for tcrmi nation of thic lease.
Disorderly
induct, abusive language. noisy disturbances, disregard of par!: rules, and
iterferenee >uth the peaceful and quiet enjoyment of other residents is
ohibited.
Receipt c r complaints from three cv- more residents regarding
sident<s) conduct shall bs the basis -f^r termination of this lease.
Nuisance.
emises-

Resident(s)

shall

net create or permit a

nuisance

on

the

P.'e s i d e n I •' - N L i a la i 1 i t y >
Resident's? 5h.-»l I be liatle an-.' responsible
e conduct of their speuss, children, and cuectc.

fo-

Ordinance-: r.r:' Tta*jtrs.
Pee :L dent '..) sS?ll cenply >.:ifch all cedes,
atutes, ordinances and requirements e«f all municipal., county? state. and
deral authorities new in force.. cr which may hereafter be in force,
rtaining to their mobile heme and the use oT premises.
Pete.
M- pr;ts shall be Lroucr.i en the p-onisso
itten consent of the Park.

without

the

prior

Su b 1 ea s e an e A s s i o nm% n1. This lease ma/ net be transferred or assigned,
r the premises sublet without the written consent of the Par!:.
Entry and Inspection.
Par!-. and Park's agents shall hare access to the
ased premises at all reasonable times to inspect and protect the same, tc
DW the same to prospective residents and for making necessary
improvements
d repairs.
Repairs.
Resident 's) shall, at own crpsnse, and at all times, maintain
? premises in a clean and sanitary manner. Resident(s) shall be responsible
all repairs and for damages caused by his negligence and that of his
nily or invitess or guests.

Indemnification,
Park will not bo responsible for accidents, injuries.
loss of property by fire, theft, wind, floods, or other natural acts which
e beyond its control.
Park shall not be liable for any damage or injury tc
k
sident(s), or any other person, cr to any property, occurring on the.
emises, or any part thereof, or in common areas, and Resident(s) shall hole
irk harmless from any claims for damages regardless of cause.
Equipment and
iparatus furnished on the grounds are solely for the convenience of resident!
id all persons using same do so at their own risl .
Waiver.
Nc failure of Park to enforce any term hereof shall be deemed a
dver f
nor shall any acceptance of a partial payment of rent be deemed £
tiver of Park's right to the full amount.
Default.
Should ResidentCs? fail to pay rent when due or violate any
lie or other term or condition of this lease. Par!-: may elect to (a) continue
te lease in effect and enforce all its rights and remedies hereunder,
icluding the right tc recover the rent as it becomes due, or <b) at any time.
?rminate all of Rpsident(s) rights hereunder and recover from Resident(s) all
images the Pa-*!. n?i%/ incur by reason of the breach of the ler.se- All propert\
i the premises is hereby subject to a lier, in favor of Park, 'or payment of
LI sums due to the ma/iimu- extent allowed by I«w.
.Noticesr Any nctice r?> be given by mailing the sa.r.c, postage prepaid, tc
ftsident(s) at the prsr.iser, the P-rk man-gar.
k\*to
±Q^*Vnrk.
$.4*4&
,
r
lose address is IMO East 11400 South, Scndy, 'Jtrh is authorized to
*
it on behalf- z? the Pari: to receive notice:; cor.cernir.g the daily operation of
he Park.
Service of proiocr upon Park .Toy cr.ly be mad- by service upon Ja>
asmussen, l?rr- East Vine St., Suit- 150, Salt Lr.l c City, Utah 84121.
Attorns-/' s fees.
In the c-.ert Pari- r e f e s this Lease to an attorney for
nforcement c termination, with cr without suit. Resident (s) shall pay all
osts incurred, including attorney's fees.
Time.

is o r the essence of this agreement.
IRESCEWP/'DCT VILLAGE

Z/yfU

TabC

TO:

JUNE JOHNSON
255 E.HIDDEN VIEW DRIVE #267
SANDYfUTAH 84Q7Q

You are hereby notified that you are in violation of the
park rules an/or leasehold provisions for the following reasons:
!

UNLICENSED VEHICLE-(WHITE CADILLAC) IN DRIVEWAY
RULE #2b.

2.

YARD NOT MAINTAINED IN A NEAT,CLEAN,WEED FREE
CONDITION, SWAMP COOLER AND BICYCLE PARTS,AND ALL
MICELLANEOUS ITEMS MUST BE STORED PROPERLY, OUT OF
DRIVEWAY.
HOME NEEDS TO BE PAINTED,

3.

Pursuant to Section 57-16-6 (2) (a), Utah Code Annotated,
you are hereby notified that you must cure the aforesaid violations
within fifteen (15) days of the date of service of this Notice on
you by curing and/or refraining from the above violations. If you
fail to cure and/or refrain the referred to violations within said
fifteen (15) day period, or a written agreement is not made between
the park and you allowing for a variation in the rule or cure
period, or vacate the premises within such period of Fifteen (15)
days, you will be in violation of the above states statute and your
lease agreement and rules of the park.
If you fail to cure the
violations, eviction will be commenced against you to evict you
from the premises and to obtain judgment against you for any rent
and other charges accrued, together with attorney's fees and costs.
You are further put on notice, pursuant to Section 57-165(2) r Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended, that in the event you cure
the above referred to violations, and should you in the future
again violate the above rules or a different rule of the park, this
will result in forfeiture of your lease and eviction without any
further period of cure.

This Notice is given and served in accordance with
Sections 57-16-3, 57-16-5 and 57-16-6, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as
amended.
Please govern yourself accordingly.
DATED this

5

day of

MAY

, 19

B y : — * < ^ ^ ? ^ /1*?*-/ V J ^{i± •<LAManager for CRESCENTWOOD
Mobile Home Park
Address: 250 EAST 11400 SOUTH
SANDY,UTAH
84070
Telephone: 572-6333

93

.

Jay W e a v e r
Constable
Salt Lake County .
P.O. Box 538
Sandy, Utah 84091
Phone: (801) 571-7211

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
)

CONSTABLE'S RETURN OF SERVICE

I do hereby make return of service and certify:
1.

2.

I am a duly qualified and acting Constable for the County of Salt Lake,
State of Utah, a citizen of the United States of America, a person over
the age of eighteen at the time of this action, and that I am not a party
to this action.
A^iDAVll AND ORDER
I received the within and hereto annexed L-a-c/v«£SLsy-*5^
|^
U^u
SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT

fiof-

on the

h

day of

^ ^ ^

, 1993, and served the same upon

, 1993,
day of
the within named defendant on the
by then and there delivering and leaving a true copy of said paper with

the C~O — VAJ \~V->0-—J
of said defendant, being a person of
suitable age and discretion at the time of said service, residing at

"T^^

which is the usual place of abode or business of said defendant
/
CkjAsJl tfW ^VAjCxJl^^o <K C o p p e r
1
I do further certify and return that at! the time of said service I did
endorse, the date of service, and my name and official title on the
copy so served.

£~£

DATED AT SANDY, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, ON

, 1993.

FEE
MILEAGE
MILES_
TRIPS"

1

2ND ADDRESS

3 cfez

CONSTABLE, 2ALJ LAKE COUNTY
Subscribed to me tftis date :

^

CO

NOTARY PUBLIC

lUs^-

^/<?3

TabD

TO:

JUNE JOHNSON
255 E.HIDDEN VIEW HPTVF #267
SANDY^rTTfrH
RdCiin

You are hereby notified that you must remove the mobile
home, yourself and the other residents living in the mobile home
from the premises located at the address set forth above within
three (3) days of your receipt of this notice.
You were served with a fifteen day notice on MAY
5
, 19 93 for non-compliance of mobile home park rules.
A copy of said notice is attached hereto. Pursuant to Section 5716-5(2), Utah Code Annotated (1953), repeated failure to abide by
mobile home park rules, after being served with a prior fifteen day
notice of non-compliance, may result in termination of the lease.
The applicable portion of Section 57-16-5(2) states as follows:
An agreement for the lease of mobile home space in a
mobile home park may be terminated during its term by
mutual agreement or for any one or more of the following
causes: ....(2) Repeated failure of a resident to abide
by a mobile home park rule, if the original notice of
non-compliance states that another violation of the same
or a different rule might result in forfeiture* without
any further period of cure.
You are now again violating the rules of the mobile home
park for the following reasons:
1.

YARD NOT MAINTAINED IN A CLEAN,MEAT AND
WEED FREE CONDITION r WEKP£ AT.ONH BOTW g m p p n F
•
DRIVFWAY,RAILING NOT INSTALLED ON BACK PORCH.
2.
WEEDS IN E3ST SIDE OF YARD, KTr.YCT.r. P a P T ^ w n n n r ^
PALLETS AND MICELLANEOUS TRASH TN VARD.
•
SON-JARED BEAGLEY HAS BEEN OUT AFTER CURFEW
3.
ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS.
_•
If you do not remove your mobile home, yourself, and any
other residents living in the mobile home, from the park within
three (3) days after service of this notice, you will be in
violation of the above states statute and your lease agreement and
the rules of the Park.' If you fail to move out of the Park within
the above stated time, an action will be commenced against you to
evict you from the premiss and to obtain judgment ;u.jai.iir.l; you i'oi;
the rent and other charges accrued, together with attorney fees and

This Notice is given and served in accordance with the
provisions of Sections 57-16-5 and 57-16-6, Utah Code Ann., 1953,
as amended.
Please govern yourself accordingly.

Jay Weaver
Constable
Salt Lake County
P.O. Box 538
Sandy, Utah 84091
Phone: (801) 571-7211
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

CONSTABLE'S RETURN OF SERVICE

I do hereby make return of service and certify:
1.

2.

I am a duly qualified and acting Constable for the County of Salt Lake,
State of Utah, a citizen of the United States of America, a person over
the age of eighteen at the time of this action, and that I am not a party
to this action.
AFFIDAVIT AND ORDER
.f j
2
I received the within and hereto annexed
L ^ o - A * . "T-* -^^^^^^
vv^
SW1I10N0 AND COMPLAINT
on the

.J

day of

^ H

, 1993, and served the same upon

the within named defendant on the
day of ^
. 1993,
3
by then and there delivering and leaving a true copy of said paper with

\A
the ^ C-O-

UO

of said defendant, being a person of
discretic at the time of said service, residing-^
suitable age and discretion
which is the usual place of abode or business of said defendant.
I do further certify and re"turn "that at the time of said service I did
endorse the date of service,' and ray name and official title on the
copy so served.
DATED AT SANDY, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, ON
FEE
MILEAGE
MILES
TRIPS"

:

J
/

'K'J

. 1993.

$

CONSTABLE, MUX LAKE\ COUNTY
Subscribed to me this date: o[j

2ND ADDRESS
NOTARY PUBLIC

[ ^ '^

TabE

Tnira judicial D.-sjnct

DEC 2 Wk
?u:y Oi&lc

James R. Boud, USB #A0388
Bradley R. Jones, USB #A4747
ASHTON, BRAUNBERGER, POULSEN & BOUD, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
302 West 5400 South, Suite 103
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 263-0300
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CRESCENTWOOD VILLAGE, INC.,
Plaintiff,

;
l
I

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1
i

Civil No. 930906137
Judge Tyrone Medley

vs.
JUNE JOHNSON,
Defendant.

The trial in the above case was held before the above
Court on Wednesday, November 2, 1994, the Honorable Tyrone E.
Medley, presiding. James R. Boud appeared on behalf of Plaintiff,
and John T. Anderson appeared on behalf of Defendant.
were also present along with various witnesses.

The parties

The Court, after

considering the evidence introduced during the course of the trial,
reviewing the exhibits, giving consideration to the trial brief
submitted by Mr. Anderson, reading the cases referred to in the
trial brief, considering the principles of law and considering the
testimony of witnesses, makes the following Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court finds that the parties entered into a

lease agreement, which lease agreement included as an attachment
all of the rules and regulations of the mobile home park dated July
1, 1992, a copy of which was introduced into evidence as Exhibit
"p-l".

This lease agreement was for the lease of a mobile home

space known as 255 E. Hidden View Drive, #267, Sandy, Utah.
2.

The Court ^inds that Plaintiff's Exhibit "P-2".

which was a 15-day eviction notice dated May 5, 1993, was served
upon the Defendant,

June Johnson, on May

violations as set forth in the notice.

6,

1993, for rule

The Court specifically

finds that the eviction notice was not served upon June Johnson for
any religious reasons nor because the Defendant was living in a
polygamous family structure.

The only intent by the Plaintiff and

by

said

its

agents

in

serving

notice

was

because

of

rule

violations.
3.

The Court finds that there are other families in the

Plaintiff's mobile home park who are living in a polygamous family
structure who have not been evicted.

The Court further finds that

Defendant has other sister-wives living in the park on separate
mobile home spaces and in separate mobile homes who are not being
evicted.
4.
enforces

The Court further finds that the Plaintiff regularly

the parkfs

irrespective

of

rules and

their

regulations

religion,

structure, or family status.
2

religious

against residents,
persuasion,

family

5.

The Court finds that over a period of four years the

Plaintiff in this case and its predecessor in interest, has been
required to enforce many rule violations by the Defendant, June
Johnson•

The Court further finds that the Plaintiff and its

predecessor in interest has tried to work with the Defendant, June
Johnson, to get her to abide by the rules and regulations of the
mobile home park during this time period.
6.

The Court finds that the rules and regulations of

the mobile home park in this particular case, and especially those
rules and regulations which were enforced by the park in the two
eviction notices it served, are reasonable and necessary ~o promote
the health, safety, and welfare of the park residents.
/£?

The Court finds that after the Defendant was served

with the 15-day notice dated May 5, 1993, the Defendant attempted
to cure the rule violations as set forth in that notice. The Court
finds that the Defendant did completely cure the unlicensed vehicle
violation and completely cured the mobile home painting violation.
8.

The Court also finds that the Defendant did much to

cure the violation relating to the condition of her lot being kept
in a neat, clean, and weed free condition.
the

Defendant

removed

much

of

The Court finds that

the garbage

and

weed

growth

surrounding her mobile home; however, the Defendant did not remove
all of the garbage and weeds and therefore never fully cured the
violation relatincr to the condition of Jjer mobile home lot.
9.

The Court finds that as time went on after the 15 days

expired from the May 5, 1993 notice, the Defendant failed to
3

maintain her yard in a clean, neat and weed free condition.

This

Court finds that the Defendant failed to continue to control the
weed problem at her premises as evidenced by significant new growth
in weeds.

The Court further finds that additional new garbage,

trash, and other objects accumulated on Defendant's lot. The Court
finds that because of the ongoing nature of this violation, and the
fact of the new weed growth, new garbage, and new accumulations of
other junk or trash on her lot; this was aC new violation of the
rules.
10.

The Court further finds that after the expiration of

the May 5, 1993 notice, the Defendant violated on several occasions
another rule of the park relating to violation of the curfew rule
for her pinor son). Jared.
11.

The Court finds that after the May 5, 1993 notice

had expired, the Defendant received two oral notices from Mr. Shupe
that she was again^failing to maintain the garbage, trash, and
f^

weeds on her lot, which was a violation of the park rules.

w

These

verbal warnings were given to the Defendant in July of 1993, and

?/
/\>J

k

the Defendant did absolutely nothing about the warnings and ignored
them.
12.

The Court finds that the garbage, trash, and weed

problems on the Defendant's lot were ongoing in nature because of
continued accumulation of weeds, trash, and garbage.

The Court

finds that this problem worsened with time and that when Plaintiff
on August 3, 1993 served its notice of lease termination for
repeated failure to comply.

This notice was introduced as Exhibit
4

"P-3,f.

The Court finds that this eviction notice was served after

a passage of more than sixty days from the expiration of the May 5,
1993 notice, and considering the nature of the rule violations, the
Court finds that this was a reasonable period of time that would
not

trigger

or require

an

additional

period

of cure

or an

additional new 15-day notice as suggested by the Defendant in this
particular case.
13.

The Court does not find under the specific facts of

this case that a new 15-day notice was required by the lease
agreement

itself, by the law submitted to the Court by the

Defendant, or by the application of the applicable statutes.

In

fact, the Court finds that the applicable statutes and notices
served in this case are to the contrary and do not require an
additional period to cure.
14.

The Court finds that the rental check of $425.00

received by the Plaintiff from the Defendant on August 2, 1993, was
for delinquent rent for the months of June and July, 1993, leaving
the month of August, 1993 still outstanding.

The Court finds that

this rent was received and deposited by Plaintiff prior to the time
the Defendant was served with an eviction notice on August 3, 1993.
The Court finds that the date of tender of the check by the
Defendant was the date of payment on August 2, 1993, that the
Plaintiff deposited said rent check before service of an eviction
notice, and that the Defendant's argument that the Defendant's
check had not cleared all banking channels in the Federal Reserve
System prior to the service of the eviction notice is not a valid
5

argument.
15.

The Court finds that Mrs. Brenda Shupe was a very

credible witness for the Plaintiff, despite the fact that she
appeared to be getting a little bit irritated on the witness stand.
The Court finds that her credibility was not attacked in any
substantial way by the defense, and the Court places great weight
on her testimony, credibility, and veracity of her testimony. The
Court finds that Mrs. Shupe was instructed by June Johnson to apply
a §400.00 check dated July IS, 1993, to one of the Defendant's
sister-wives' mobile home spaces in the park and not to the
Defendant's space.

This finding is further backed up by the fact

that June Johnson came in and paid rent on August 2, 1993, in the
amount of $425.00, and had she paid rent for her own space on July
19, 1993, in the amount of $400.00, she would have been making a
very substantial overpayment of rent on August 2, 1993.
16.

The Court finds that it was a common occurrence for

June Johnson or one of her sister-wives to come to Mrs. Brenda
Shupe and pay the monthly rental payment for another sister-wife
who

was

occupying

a

separate

mobile home

space

within

the

Plaintiff's mobile home park, and that this was done by June
Johnson on or about July 19, 1993, even though she had :nreviouslv
beejx^served with a 3-day eviction notice fc>r nonpayment of rent,
which had not been cured.

The Court further finds that after the

payment of rent on August 2, 1993, despite the fact that the
Defendant was not current on the rent, that the Plaintiff only
served an eviction notice relating to rule violations of the park
6

and not to delinquency in rent.
17.

The Court finds that Mrs. Shupe made an honest

mistake in the record keeping and clarified that mistake during the
course of her testimony when she pointed out the fact that after
receiving August 2, 1993 rent, one part of her ledger reflected
that that was payment of rent through August of 1993.

The Court

further finds that another part of Mrs. Shupe1s ledger did reflect
that there was still one month's rent owing after the payment of
rent by June Johnson on August 2, 1993.
18.

The

Court

finds

that

the

other

residents

in

Plaintiff's mobile home park have had their general health, safety
and welfare impacted negatively as a result of the Defendant's
failure to maintain and control the weed problem,

the trash

problem, the garbage problem, and the curfew violations by the
Defendant's son.

The Court also finds that the Defendant lived

next to another resident who would find dirty diapers and other
trash in her yard, which the Court finds came from the yard of
Defendant.
19.

The Court also finds that the Defendant did not

control the actions

of her /sop^ and that he violated curfew

limitations on a number of occasions after May of 1993 and prior to
August

3,

1993.

These

curfew

violations

included

lighting

fireworks in the park late at night, which fireworks landed in at
least one neighboring mobile home space.
20.

The Court finds that although Plaintiff had no

contractual duty to do so, the Plaintiff occasionally provided an
7

opportunity for residents during the course of the year to place
trash or other items in a dumpster or in Mr. Shupe's trailer. The
Court finds that the Plaintiff made Defendant, June Johnson, aware
of the availability of its dumpster and trailer for use in cleaning
up her lot. The Court further finds that Mrs. Johnson did not take
advantage of the use of the dumpster or trailer fcr use in hauling
off garbage from her lot.
21.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff engaged in no

conduct that would have led the Defendant, June Johnson, to believe
that the Plaintiff would waive strict compliance with the park
rules, regulations, and lease agreement.

This findings is an

additional basis why the Court finds that the Plaintiff was not
required under the facts and circumstances of this case to provide
new notice or a new opportunity to cure in this particular case
after the first 15-day notice. The Court finds that because of the
ongoing nature of the rule violations by the Defendant, that the
equitable considerations in this particular case weigh heavily in
favor of the Plaintiff and not the Defendant, because, among other
things, the evidence clearly established that the Plaintiff had
worked with the Defendant a number of times and over a long period
of time in an effort to get her to cure rule violations, including
those rule violations which are the subject of this particular
lawsuit. There was apattern established that the Plaintiff txied
to

work

with

considerations

the

Defendant;

and,

hence,

the

equitable

in this Court's opinion point in favor of the

Plaintiff.
8

22.
authorities

The

Court

cited

by

distinguishable

finds
the

that

for

Defendant's

the

most

trial

part

the

brief

are

from the facts of this particular case.

For

example, the Court found that the Woodland Theaters, Inc. v. ABC
Intermountain Theaters, Inc. case, 560 P. 2d 700 (Utah 1977) was not
applicable to this particular action because, in this case, the
Court has found that the Plaintiff did not accept rent after the
notice of termination was served, and the Court has found that the
rent paid was for delinquent past rent and not the present or
future rent.
23.

The Court finds that the notices in this particular

case were legally sufficient, consistent with the lease agreement,
and consistent with Utah Code Annotated §57-16-5 and Utah Code
Annotated §57-16-6.
24.

The Court finds that its previous order entered in

January of 1994 relating to the dismissal of the counterclaim was
a dismissal without prejudice and that there may be other legal
issues or concepts in this case that may impact on whether or not
the Defendant can revive this counterclaim, especially in light of
the fact that the Court has clearly found that the Plaintiff did
not bring its eviction proceeding for any reason other than rule
violations and that the Plaintiff did not discriminate in any way
against the Defendant on the grounds of religion, family status, or
family

lifestyle of the Defendant due to the

fact that the

Defendant is a polygamist,
25.

The Court finds that it is reasonable to enter in a
9

no cause of action judgment on the third party complaint which was
brought

by

the

Defendant,

June

Johnson,

against

the

three

individuals listed as Third Party Defendants. The Court finds that
the Defendant failed to establish this cause of action by any
evidence whatsoever, and that the evidence

introduced by the

Plaintiff clearly establishes that the third party complaint has no
merit whatsoever

due to the

fact that this

action, and the

motivation therefor, was based solely upon rule violations of the
park and not any religious, lifestyle, or family structure issues
whatsoever.
26.

The Court finds that the attorney's fees in this

case requested by the Plaintiff are reasonable.

In making this

finding, the Court finds and states that it reviewed the affidavit
of Plaintiff in support of attorney's fees and costs on a line by
line basis and that it did not make a summary review of the
document. The Court also reviewed line by line each task described
on each line in the affidavit and made a specific and separate
evaluation of the reasonable period of time it would have taken to
perform each task. The Court also, in finding that the attorney's
fees were reasonable, reviewed the full history of this case in an
attempt to determine what a reasonable attorney's fee would be in
this particular case. The Court finds that this was not a typical
unlawful detainer case and that it became far more involved and
time consuming and complex.

This case actually started out in

Circuit Court but, as a result of the answer and claims filed by
the Defendant, this particular case was ultimately transferred to
10

the District Court.

There were a number of motions filed by both

parties in this case which made it a little more unusual as
compared to a standard eviction case.

The Defendant in this case

represented herself, filed a motion to quash early in this case and
a request for attorney's fees even though she was pro se and not a
lawyer.

The Defendant also filed a motion for clarification of

rehearing on this Court's ruling striking the counterclaim.
were a number of motions filed with discovery

There

issues by the

Defendant, as well as motions for summary judgment filed by the
Defendant.

The Defendant also appealed one of this Court's prior

orders to the Utah Supreme Court, to which the Plaintiff had to
respond. At one point in this case the Court was required to grant
Plaintiff's

motion

for

a

protective

order

because

of

the

overburdensome discovery that was being requested by the Defendant.
The Court finds this case has a very long history and this Court is
~f the opinion that the case did not move along the system as
efficiently as it probably should have because of the fact that the
Defendant in this case was pro se and continued to file numerous
pleadings with the Court to which the Plaintiff had to respond and
required additional attorney's fees.
27.
Plaintiff

of

The Court finds that the hourly rate charged by the
$95.00

an

hour,

taking

into

consideration

the

Plaintiff's expertise in this particular area of the law, is a
reasonable hourly rate in this community

for these types of

services. The Court has used its background to determine that this
was a reasonable rate in light of the fact that it is regularly
11

confronted with the issue of attorney's fees and is knowledgeable
of what attorneys in this community charge.
28.

The Court finds -hat the Plaintiff's request for

attorney's fees in the amount of $9,3 67.50 and $4 6.00 in costs is
reasonable.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff's attorney put in

approximately
necessitated

100 hours of legal services, much of which was
by

the

inefficiency

of

the

Defendant

in

this

particular case to deal with various issues that arose during the
course of the case.

The Court finds that

100 hours was a

conservative figure of time incurred by the Plaintiff's attorney
and that this figure was reasonable.

The Court finds that every

entry as to time and task described in the Plaintiff's affidavit
for attorney's fees was reviewed by the Court and was reasonable.
The Court finds that there was a rational, reasonable relationship
between each task and the time allotted for the task, and nothing
appeared to be inflated in the affidavit.

The Court therefore

finds that the request for attorney's fees and costs are reasonable
and should be granted.
29.

The Court finds that the Defendant breached the

lease agreement by failing to follow the rules and regulations of
the park in this particular case and that the Defendant committed
a new rule violation in light of the continuing nature and ongoing
nature of the violations of trash, garbage, and weeds, as well as
the violation relating regarding the curfew of her son.
30.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to

have the lease agreement between the parties terminated and that
12

the Clerk of the Court should issue a writ of restitution restoring
Plaintiff to the premises.
31.

The Court

finds that Plaintiff

is entitled to

judgment for rent from August of 1993 through March 31, 1994, in
the amount of $195.00 per month and for judgment in the amount of
$2 05.00 per month for the time period beginning April 1, 1994 to
the date of trial for a total of $3,200.00.
32.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to

all rents which are currently being held in trust by the Clerk of
the Court and that these rents should be credited against the
judgment being rendered herein.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court
concludes that:
1.
Defendant

in

That Plaintiff
the

amount

is entitled to judgment against

of

$3,200.00

principal,

$9,367.50

attorney's fees, and $46.00 costs;
2.

The Court concludes that the notices served in this

case were legally sufficient, consistent with the lease agreement,
and consistent with Utah State statutes, including Utah Code
Annotated §57-16-5 and §57-16-6.
3.

The Court concludes that the lease agreement between

the parties should be terminated and that the Plaintiff is entitled
to a writ of restitution restoring the premises to it located at
255 East Hidden View Drive, #267, Sandy, Utah.
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4.

The Court concludes that Plaintiff has met its

burden of proof on all issues in the case.
5.

The Court concludes that the third party complaint

filed by the Defendant should be dismissed with prejudice.
6.

The

Court

concludes

that

the

attorney's

fees

requested by the Plaintiff are reasonable based upon all the facts
and circumstances of this case.
DATED this ^ -

>,

day of

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Johri<~T.' Anderson
Attorney for Defendant

014-072-bn
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